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Once the zero bound on nominal interest rates is taken into account, Taylor-type
interest-rate feedback rules give rise to unintended self-fulﬁlling decelerating inﬂation
paths and aggregate ﬂuctuations driven by arbitrary revisions in expectations. These
undesirable equilibria exhibit the essential features of liquidity traps, as monetary pol-
icy is ineﬀective in bringing about the government’s goals regarding the stability of
output and prices. This paper proposes several ﬁscal and monetary policies that pre-
serve the appealing features of Taylor rules, such as local uniqueness of equilibrium
near the inﬂation target, and at the same time rule out the deﬂationary expectations
that can lead an economy into a liquidity trap.
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In recent years, there has been a revival of empirical and theoretical research aimed at
understanding the macroeconomic consequences of monetary policy regimes that take the
form of interest-rate feedback rules. One driving force of this renewed interest can be found
in empirical studies showing that in the past two decades monetary policy in the United
States is well described as following such a rule. In particular, an inﬂuential paper by Taylor
(1993) characterizes the Federal Reserve as following a simple rule whereby the federal funds
rate is set as a linear function of inﬂation and the output gap with coeﬃcients of 1.5 and
0.5, respectively. Taylor emphasizes the stabilizing role of an inﬂation coeﬃcient greater
than unity, which loosely speaking implies that the central bank raises real interest rates in
response to increases in the rate of inﬂation. After his seminal paper, interest-rate feedback
rules with this feature have become known as Taylor rules. Taylor rules have also been shown
to represent an adequate description of monetary policy in other industrialized economies
(see, for example, Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler, 1998).
At the same time, a growing body of theoretical work has argued that Taylor rules
contribute to macroeconomic stability. Researchers have arrived at this conclusion following
diﬀerent routes. For example, Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999) use a non-optimizing,
rational expectations model and ﬁnd that a Taylor rule is the optimal interest-rate feedback
rule in the sense that it minimizes a quadratic loss function of inﬂation and output deviations
from their respective target levels. Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) ﬁnd a similar result
using a dynamic, optimizing, general equilibrium model and a welfare criterion for policy
evaluation. Leeper (1991), Bernanke and Woodford (1997), and Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler
(1997) argue that Taylor rules contribute to aggregate stability because they guarantee the
uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium whereas interest rate feedback rules with
an inﬂation coeﬃcient of less than unity, also referred to as passive rules, are destabilizing
because they render the equilibrium indeterminate, thus allowing for expectations-driven
ﬂuctuations.
1Two important elements are common across these methodologically diverse studies: ﬁrst,
they restrict attention to local dynamics, or small ﬂuctuations, around a target level of
inﬂation; and second, they do not take into account the fact that nominal interest rates are
bounded below by zero. These two simpliﬁcations have serious consequences for aggregate
stability. In Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2000), we show, in the context of dynamic,
optimizing, general equilibrium models, with and without nominal rigidities, that if the zero
bound on nominal rates is taken into account and global dynamics are characterized, then
Taylor rules may in fact lose their appealing stability properties. In particular, equilibria
emerge in which inﬂation and the nominal interest rate start arbitrarily close to the intended
targets and converge gradually to a diﬀerent long-run equilibrium in which both variables are
below target and monetary policy is passive. Moreover, this unintended long-run equilibrium
fails to be locally unique. For in its neighborhood stationary sunspot equilibria exist in which
inﬂation, interest rates, and aggregate activity ﬂuctuate in response to non-fundamental
revisions in expectations.1
When the economy falls into this type of decelerating inﬂation dynamics, it is headed
to a situation of low and possibly negative inﬂation and low and possibly zero interest
rates in which monetary policy becomes ineﬀective in bringing about the government’s goals
regarding the stability of output and prices. This state of matters has all the essential
characteristics of a liquidity trap, at the heart of which there is a central bank that is
powerless to reverse the downward slide in prices through expansionary monetary policy in
the form of lower and lower interest rates.
The central focus of this paper is the design of ﬁscal and monetary policies that preserve
the Taylor rule, and with it all its desirable local properties, around the target rate of
inﬂation and real activity, and at the same time eliminate equilibrium dynamics leading to
the liquidity trap.
1A branch of the literature has focused on the limitations that the zero bound on nominal interest rates
imposes on the government’s ability to conduct countercyclical monetary policy. Model-based assessments
of the costs associated with these limitations are contained in Fuhrer and Madigan (1997), Orphanides and
Wieland (1998), Reifschneider and Williams (1999), and Wolman (1999).
2Two broad approaches to avoiding liquidity traps are presented. In the ﬁrst one, liquidity
traps are ruled out by means of ﬁscal policy while maintaining the assumption that monetary
policy follows everywhere an interest-rate rule. The proposed stabilization policy features
a strong ﬁscal stimulus that is automatically activated when inﬂation begins to decelerate.
Speciﬁcally, the ﬁscal rule consists of an inﬂation sensitive budget surplus schedule that calls
for lowering taxes when inﬂation subsides. As the economy approaches the liquidity trap,
ﬁscal deﬁcits become large enough so that this low-inﬂation steady state becomes ﬁscally
unsustainable and ceases to be a rational expectations equilibrium.
This result thus provides theoretical support for the recent policy proposals—emanating
most notably from the U.S. Department of Treasury—suggesting that economies with near-
zero nominal interest rates and thus little room for monetary stabilization policy, such as
Japan, should spend their way out of the liquidity trap.2 However, we arrive at this policy
recommendation for very diﬀerent reasons. The ﬁscal stimulus eliminates the liquidity trap
not through the traditional Keynesian multiplier, as is the conventional wisdom, but rather
by aﬀecting the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. The channel thorough
which the liquidity trap is eliminated here is more akin to Pigou’s argument on the implau-
sibility of liquidity traps. In a closed economy, the intertemporal budget constraint of the
government is the mirror image of the intertemporal budget constraint of the representative
household. A decline in taxes increases the household’s after-tax wealth, which induces an
aggregate excess demand for goods. As a consequence the price level must increase in order
to re-establish equilibrium in the goods market.
The second approach consists of switching from an interest rate rule to a money growth
rate peg should inﬂation embark on a self-fulﬁlling decelerating path. This alternative is
a popular one, frequently mentioned in the policy debate: when caught in a low inﬂation
equilibrium, governments should simply start printing money to jump start the economy.
2See, for example, the June 24, 1998 testimony of Lawrence Summers, then deputy secretary of the
Treasury, before a Senate Foreign Aﬀairs subcommittee and his remarks to the World Economic Development
Congress held on October 1, 1998 in Washington, DC.
3Krugman (1998), for example, argues forcefully for this type of policy as a way to bring
Japan out of its current recession. However, this recommendation is typically made without
any reference to the accompanying ﬁscal policy. An important result of this paper is that
switching to a money growth rate rule is a successful tool to avoid or escape a liquidity trap
only if coupled with the “right” ﬁscal policy. For instance, if the ﬁscal regime in place at the
time of the switch to a money growth rule is one that guarantees ﬁscal sustainability under
all circumstances, then printing money may in fact be counterproductive as it is likely to
accelerate the deﬂationary spiral. In general, what is needed to make the switch to a money
growth rate rule successful is a ﬁscal policy that, as nominal interest rates approach zero,
makes the government intertemporally insolvent.
The remainder of the paper is organized in ﬁve sections. Section 2 presents the model
and the baseline monetary-ﬁscal regime. Section 3 shows how the economy can fall into a
liquidity trap when monetary policy takes the form of a Taylor-type interest-rate feedback
rule. Sections 4 and 5 develop, respectively, ﬁscal and monetary instruments capable of
eliminating liquidity traps. Section 6 closes the paper by discussing the robustness of the
results to important model perturbations such as the introduction of nominal frictions, the
treatment of time as discrete, and the inclusion of Gesell taxes, which have been suggested
in the related literature as a possible way to avoid liquidity traps.
2 The model
In this section we use a simple economic environment to illustrate how a monetary–ﬁscal
regime frequently advocated on the basis of aggregate stability can in fact lead to expecta-
tional traps. The diﬀerence between our analysis and that found in the related literature is
twofold: ﬁrst, we do not restrict the analysis to local dynamics around a particular station-
ary state. Second, we take explicit account of the zero bound on nominal interest rates in
the speciﬁcation of interest rate feedback rules.
42.1 Households
Consider an endowment economy populated by a large number of identical inﬁnitely lived






where c denotes consumption, M denotes nominal money balances, and P denotes the price
level. The instantaneous utility index u is assumed to be increasing in both arguments,
concave, and to satisfy ucm > 0, so that consumption and real balances are Edgeworth
complements, and limm→∞
um(y,m)
uc(y,m) =0∀y>0, which implies that money demand approaches
inﬁnity as the nominal interest rate vanishes. In addition to ﬁat money, the representative
household has access to nominal government bonds, denoted by B, that pay the nominal
interest rate R. The household is endowed with a constant stream of perishable goods y and
pays real lump-sum taxes τ. Its instant budget constraint is then given by
Pc+ Pτ+ ˙ M + ˙ B = RB + Py.
Letting m ≡ M/P denote real balances and a ≡ (M +B)/P real ﬁnancial wealth, the above
constraint can be written as
c + τ +˙ a =( R − π)a − Rm + y, (2)
where π ≡ ˙ P/P denotes the instant rate of inﬂation. The right-hand side of this budget
constraint represents the sources of income: real interest on the household’s assets net of
the opportunity cost of holding money and the endowment. The left hand side shows the
uses of income: consumption, tax payments, and savings. Households are also subject to a






0[R(s)−π(s)]dsa(t) ≥ 0( 3 )
that prevents them from engaging in Ponzi games. This no-Ponzi-game constraint says that
the household is not permitted to implement consumption and money-holding plans that
imply that its real debt position net of money holdings grows at a rate higher than or equal
to the real interest rate. Clearly, because the utility function is increasing in consumption and
real balances, the household will always ﬁnd it optimal to satisfy the above borrowing limit
with equality. The representative household chooses paths for consumption, real balances,
and wealth so as to maximize (1) subject to the instant budget constraint (2) and the
borrowing limit (3), given its initial real wealth, a(0), and the paths of taxes, inﬂation,




˙ λ = λ[r + π − R], (6)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the instant budget constraint.
2.2 Monetary and ﬁscal policy
We assume that the monetary authority follows an interest-rate feedback rule of the form
R = R(π). (7)
We refer to monetary policy as active at an inﬂation rate π if R (π) > 1 and as passive if
R (π) < 1. Loosely speaking, monetary policy is active if the central bank raises the real
6interest rate in response to an increase in inﬂation and is passive if the central bank fails to
do so.
Three assumptions regarding the form of this feedback rule are of great consequence for
the subsequent results: ﬁrst, we assume that the nominal interest rate is non-decreasing in
inﬂation, that is,
R
 (π) ≥ 0 ∀π.
Second, the interest rate feedback rule satisﬁes the zero bound on nominal interest rates
in that regardless of how low the inﬂation rate may be, the monetary authority will never
threaten to implement a negative nominal rate. Thus,
R(π) ≥ 0 ∀π.
Third, we assume that the central bank targets a rate of inﬂation π∗ > −r and that, in
the spirit of Taylor (1993), it conducts an active monetary policy around its inﬂation target
by responding to increases (decreases) in inﬂation with a more than one-for-one increase
(decrease) in the nominal interest rate. Formally,
∃ π∗ > −r : R(π∗)=r + π∗ and R (π∗) > 1. (8)
The government ﬁnances its deﬁcits by printing money, M, and issuing nominal bonds,
B, that pay the nominal interest rate R. We assume that public consumption is zero and that
the government levies real lump-sum taxes, τ. Therefore, the sequential budget constraint
of the government is given by ˙ B = RB − ˙ M − Pτ, which can be written as
˙ a =( R − π)a − Rm − τ. (9)





where A(0) ≡ M(0) + B(0) > 0 denotes the initial level of total nominal government lia-
bilities. Following Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe (1999), we classify ﬁscal policies as
either Ricardian or Non-Ricardian. Ricardian ﬁscal policies are those that ensure that the





0[R(s)−π(s)]dsa(t) = 0 (11)
is satisﬁed under all possible, equilibrium or oﬀ-equilibrium, paths of endogenous variables,
such as the price level, the money supply, inﬂation, or the nominal interest rate. In this
section, we restrict attention to one particular Ricardian ﬁscal policy that takes the form
τ + Rm = αa, (12)
where the sequence α is chosen arbitrarily by the government subject to the constraint that
it is positive and bounded below by some α > 0. This policy states that consolidated
government revenues, that is, tax revenues plus interest savings from the issuance of money,
are always higher than a certain fraction α of total government liabilities. A special case
of this type of policy is a balanced-budget rule whereby tax revenues are equal to interest
payments on the debt, which results when α = R,p r o v i d e dR is bounded away from zero
(Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe, 1999).
82.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that consumption be equal to the endowment
c = y. (13)
Given the assumptions regarding the form of the instant utility function, equations (4), (5),
and (13) deﬁne a decreasing function linking λ and R:
λ = L(R); L
  < 0. (14)
Combining the feedback rule (7) with (4) and (14), we obtain the following ﬁrst-order dif-
ferential equation describing the equilibrium dynamics of inﬂation
R
 (π)˙ π =
−L(R(π))
L (R(π))
[R(π) − π − r]. (15)
In turn, combining the government budget constraint (9) with the monetary and ﬁscal policy
rules, equations (7) and (12), yields
˙ a =( R(π) − π − α)a (16)






0[R(π(s))−π(s)]dsa(t) = 0 (17)
A perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as an initial price level P(0) and func-
tions of time π and a satisfying (10) and (15)-(17), given the initial condition A(0). Note
that because of the assumed Ricardian nature of the ﬁscal policy regime, given a function π,
equations (10) and (16) imply a path for a that satisﬁes the transversality condition for any
initial price level P(0) > 0. It follows immediately that if an equilibrium exists, then the
9initial price level is indeterminate. However, this nominal indeterminacy is not the focus of
our analysis. We are instead concerned with real determinacy, that is, the determinacy of
the function π, which in turn governs the determination of real balances and thus welfare.
3 Falling into liquidity traps
Consider ﬁrst the steady-state solutions to equation (15), that is, constant inﬂation rates
satisfying
R(π)=r + π.
By the assumption given in (8), π∗ represents a steady-state inﬂation rate. Because π is a
non-predetermined variable, π∗ is, in fact, a perfect-foresight equilibrium. But π∗ is not the
only equilibrium. To see this, note that the existence of a steady state at which monetary
policy is active together with the assumptions that the interest-rate feedback rule is non-
decreasing and non-negative imply the existence of an inﬂation rate πL <π ∗ satisfying
R(πL)=r + πL. To facilitate the analysis, we assume that R(π) is smooth and strictly
increasing and that R(πL) > 0. The case that R(πL) = 0 is treated in the appendix, where
we show that the results of this section also obtain in this case. Clearly, πL represents
a steady-state equilibrium. This second steady-state equilibrium has the properties that
monetary policy is passive and that the inﬂation rate is below the target inﬂation rate.3
Figure 1 illustrates the multiplicity of steady-state equilibria.
Consider now the existence of equilibria other than the steady states. Note that, because
−L/(L R ) is always positive, the sign of ˙ π in equation (15) is the same as the sign of
R(π) − π − r. Because R (π∗) > 1, it follows that the high-inﬂation, active steady state π∗
3In the context of the present ﬂexible-price, endowment economy, the low-inﬂation steady-state equilib-
rium πL is in fact preferred to the target steady-state equilibrium π∗ for it is associated with higher real
balances and thus higher levels of utility. However, as shown in Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe (2000),
in the presence of nominal rigidities, the low inﬂation equilibrium may be welfare inferior to the target steady
state.
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is unstable, in the sense that trajectories initiating near π∗ diverge from π∗.T h u s , i f o n e
limits the analysis to equilibria in which π remains forever in a small neighborhood around
π∗, then the only perfect-foresight equilibrium is the active steady state itself. This local
uniqueness result has served as one key theoretical argument for advocating the use of active,
or Taylor-type, interest-rate feedback rules to ensure aggregate stability (e.g., Leeper, 1991;
and Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler, 1997).
The local equilibrium dynamics in the neighborhood of the low-inﬂation steady state πL
are quite diﬀerent from those around the target steady state π∗.S i n c eR (πL) < 1, it follows
that ˙ π is decreasing in π for π near πL. This implies that inﬂation trajectories originating in
the vicinity of πL converge to πL and thus can be supported as perfect-foresight equilibria.
Therefore, the low-inﬂation steady state is not locally unique. The local indeterminacy of
equilibrium around πL gives rise to aggregate instability in the form of stationary sunspot
equilibria.4
4For a general result on the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria in continuous-time models displaying
local indeterminacy of the perfect-foresight equilibrium see Shigoka (1994).
11In addition, as is evident from ﬁgure 1, there exists a large number of equilibrium tra-
jectories originating arbitrarily close to (and to the left of) π∗ that converge smoothly and
monotonically to πL. Along such paths the central bank, following the prescription of the
Taylor rule, continuously eases in an attempt to reverse the persistent decline in inﬂation.
But these eﬀorts are in vain, and indeed counterproductive, for they introduce further down-
ward pressure on inﬂation. This state of matters, in which monetary policy fails to stop the
deceleration in prices, is central to the notion of a liquidity trap. Another aspect of these
dynamics that is essential to the concept of liquidity traps is their self-fulﬁlling nature: all
that is needed to fall into the liquidity trap is that people expect the economy to slide into
a phase of decelerating inﬂation.
4 Avoiding liquidity traps through ﬁscal policy
In this section, we develop policy schemes designed to eliminate the liquidity trap. The
strategy is to modify ﬁscal policy while maintaining the assumed monetary policy. Speciﬁ-
cally, we consider ﬁscal adjustment mechanisms that are automatically activated whenever
the economy embarks on a self-fulﬁlling path of decelerating inﬂation. These mechanisms
will rule out liquidity traps by making the low-inﬂation steady state ﬁscally unsustainable.
4.1 An inﬂation-sensitive revenue schedule
Consider replacing the Ricardian ﬁscal policy given by (12) with one in which the coeﬃcient
α, reﬂecting the sensitivity of consolidated government revenues with respect to the level of
total government liabilities, is an increasing function of the inﬂation rate. Speciﬁcally, the
ﬁscal policy now takes the form
τ + Rm = α(π)a; α
  > 0. (18)
12We impose the following additional restrictions on the function α:
α(π
∗) > 0 (19)
and
α(π
L) < 0. (20)
This policy guarantees that the intended steady state π∗ is a perfect-foresight equilibrium
and at the same time rules out the liquidity trap πL as an equilibrium outcome. To see this,
combine (18) and the Taylor rule (7) with the instant government budget constraint (9) to
obtain the following equilibrium law of motion for a:
˙ a =( R(π) − π − α(π))a. (21)
















Consider an inﬂation trajectory along which π = π∗. By condition (19), the right hand side
of (22) equals zero. Therefore, the transversality condition is satisﬁed and π = π∗ represents
a perfect-foresight equilibrium.
On the other hand, for an inﬂation trajectory in which π converges to the liquidity trap
πL, condition (20) implies that the right hand side of (22) does not converge to zero (except
in the special case in which initial total government liabilities, a(0), are exactly equal to
13zero), thus violating the transversality condition. As a result, no inﬂation path leading to
the liquidity trap can be supported as an equilibrium outcome.
Targeting the growth rate of nominal government liabilities









Expressing ˙ A/A as ˙ a/a + π and combining the above ﬁscal policy rule with the instant
government budget constraint (9) yields
τ + Rm =[ R(π) − k]a.
This ﬁscal policy rule is a special case of the one given in equation (18) when α(π)t a k e st h e
form R(π) − k. In particular, note that, because the Taylor rule is increasing in the rate of
inﬂation, so is R(π)−k. Furthermore, condition (24) implies that restrictions (19) and (20)
are satisﬁed. It follows immediately that targeting the growth rate of nominal government
liabilities is a potential way of eliminating equilibrium deﬂationary spirals.
Under this policy, the government manages to fend oﬀ a low inﬂation equilibrium by
threatening to implement a ﬁscal stimulus package consisting in a severe increase in the
consolidated deﬁcit should the inﬂation rate become suﬃciently low. Interestingly, this type
of policy prescription is what the U.S. Treasury as well as a large number of academic and
professional economists are advocating as a way for Japan to lift itself out of its current
14deﬂationary trap.
Abalanced-budget requirement
Consider now a ﬁscal policy rule consisting of a zero secondary deﬁcit, that is,
Pτ = RB,
where B denotes outstanding interest-bearing public debt. This policy rule requires that the
government equates its primary surplus, Pτ, to interest payments on the public debt, RB,
so that the secondary deﬁcit, given by RB − Pτ, is always equal to zero. Recalling that
a = B/P + m, we can rewrite the balanced-budget rule as
τ + Rm = R(π)a.
It follows that a balanced-budget requirement is a special case of the ﬁscal policy rule
given in (21) in which α(π)=R(π). Clearly, in this case α(π) is increasing because so
is R(π). Condition (19) is satisﬁed because R(π∗) is by assumption greater than zero. On
the other hand, condition (20) is not satisﬁed because of our maintained assumption that
R(πL) > 0. However, if one relaxes this assumption by considering the case of a Taylor rule
that stipulates zero nominal interest rates at suﬃciently low rates of inﬂation, it becomes
clear that a balanced-budget rule eliminates the liquidity trap as long as nominal interest
rate paths leading to the liquidity trap satisfy limt→∞
  t
0 R(s)ds < ∞.T o s e e w h y , n o t e
that under a balanced-budget rule the law of motion of real total government liabilities is
given by ˙ a = −πa. Combining this expression with the transversality condition (11) yields
limt→∞ a(0)e−
R t
0 R(s)ds = 0. In the appendix, we present two examples involving a Taylor rule
that sets the nominal interest rate to zero at low rates of inﬂation. In one of the examples
paths leading to the liquidity trap feature nominal interest rates that converge to zero but
never actually reach that ﬂoor. In the other example, the nominal interest rate reaches the
15zero bound in ﬁnite time. We show that in both cases, a balanced-budget rule succeeds in
averting the liquidity trap. These examples show that it is in principle possible to escape
the liquidity trap without generating ﬁscal deﬁcits, if the central bank is credibly committed
to conducting unlimited open market operations at zero nominal interest rates in the event
that inﬂation falls below a certain threshold.
5 Avoiding liquidity traps through a monetary-regime
switch
Thus far, we have studied the design of ﬁscal policies capable of eliminating liquidity traps
when the monetary authority follows an interest-rate feedback rule that is valid globally (i.e.,
for all possible values of the inﬂation rate). An alternative route to avoiding self-fulﬁlling
liquidity traps is to modify monetary policy when the economy seems to be headed toward a
low-inﬂation spiral. For example, in the case of Japan, a frequently advocated strategy to lift
the economy out of deﬂation is for the Bank of Japan to switch to a money growth rate target
letting interest rates be market determined. In this section, we show that abandoning an
interest rate feedback rule in favor of a monetary target when inﬂation reaches dangerously
low levels can be a successful way to avoid falling into a deﬂationary trap, but it need not
be. The eﬀectiveness of such alternative will in general depend upon the accompanying ﬁscal
regime. We illustrate this general conclusion by means of two examples.
5.1 Switching to a money growth rule is ineﬀective when ﬁscal
policy is Ricardian
We begin by showing that under the Ricardian ﬁscal policy rule given by (12), switching
from an interest-rate feedback rule to a money growth rate rule as the nominal interest
rate gets close to zero will not eliminate self-fulﬁlling deﬂations. To establish this result, it
16is enough to show that under this ﬁscal regime self-fulﬁlling deﬂations exist even under a




where µ>−r is a constant.5 This monetary policy implies that
˙ m
m
= µ − π. (26)
A perfect-foresight equilibrium can then be deﬁned as functions of time c, m, π, λ,a n d
R satisfying (4), (5), (6), (13) and (26). As we have shown above, under the assumed
ﬁscal policy the transversality condition (17) is always satisﬁed, so we do not include it
in our deﬁnition of equilibrium. Combining the equilibrium conditions yields the following
diﬀerential equation in real balances:
˙ m =








Any function m satisfying this diﬀerential equation represents a perfect-foresight equilibrium.
Figure 2 depicts the corresponding phase diagram. Because m is a jump variable, one possible
equilibrium is a steady-state equilibrium given by m =   m,w h e r e  m is a constant satisfying
r + µ =
um(y,   m)
uc(y,   m)
.
Given our maintained assumptions that consumption and real balances are Edgeworth com-
plements (ucm > 0) and that the instant utility index is concave (so that umm < 0), we
have that there is a unique steady-state equilibrium and that ˙ m>0f o rm>  m and ˙ m<0
5Note that we allow for both positive and negative rates of monetary expansion. This is of interest for
the results that follow because under the ﬁscal regime typically assumed in the literature on speculative
deﬂations (namely, B = 0 at all times), self-fulﬁlling deﬂations occur only for negative money growth rates
(Woodford, 1994).
17Figure 2: The phase diagram of m under a money growth rate target, Eqn. (27)
m
   ^ m
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 ⋅   
0  
for m<  m. It follows immediately that there exists a continuum of equilibria, originating
to the right of   m, with the characteristic that the economy falls into a deﬂationary trap in
which real balances grow without bound and the nominal interest rate approaches zero.6
The policy implication of this result is that when ﬁscal policy is Ricardian, switching from
an interest-rate feedback rule to a money growth rate rule as the economy approaches the
liquidity trap makes things only worse, as it pushes the economy to an even more severe case
of deﬂation.
5.2 Switching to a money growth rule may be eﬀective when ﬁscal
policy is not Ricardian
It should be clear at this point that whether the adoption of a monetary target represents a
successful tool for escaping liquidity traps depends crucially upon the assumed ﬁscal stance.
As the previous discussion demonstrates, when ﬁscal policy is Ricardian, a switch to a mon-
etary target is likely to be counterproductive. However, the central result of this subsection
6Clearly, speculative hyperinﬂations are also possible. Such explosive price-level paths could be ruled out
by introducing restrictions on individual preferences (as in Brock, 1974, 1975) or on the government’s ability
to guarantee a minimum redemption value for money (as in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1983).
18is that when ﬁscal policy is not Ricardian, the monetary authority may be able to inﬂate its
way out of a liquidity trap by targeting a suﬃciently high rate of money growth.
We convey this argument by studying a ﬁscal regime under which trajectories leading to
a liquidity trap are possible when monetary policy takes the form of an interest-rate feedback
rule like (7), but are impossible when the central bank controls the rate of expansion of the
monetary aggregate. We then use this insight to construct a monetary regime that keeps
the appealing properties of a Taylor rule in the neighborhood of the target rate of inﬂation
π∗ and eliminates the possibility of liquidity traps by switching to a money growth rate rule
when the economy approaches the low-inﬂation steady state πL.
Consider, for example, a ﬁscal policy whereby public debt is exogenous, non-negative,
and bounded by an exponential function of time. Speciﬁcally,7
0 ≤ B(t) ≤ ¯ Be
gt; ¯ B ≥ 0. (28)
To see that ﬁscal policies belonging to this class are not Ricardian, consider, for example, a
trajectory of nominal interest rates converging to a constant less than g. Clearly, in this case
the present discounted value of public debt converges to inﬁnity, violating the transversality
condition (11).
We begin by showing that if the ﬁscal policy restriction (28) is combined with the interest-
rate feedback rule (7), then self-fulﬁlling liquidity traps may occur in equilibrium. For the
analysis that follows, it will prove convenient to rewrite the equilibrium conditions in terms
of sequences for real balances and nominal debt rather than in terms of inﬂation and real




[r + π(m) − R(π(m))], (29)
7This expression deﬁnes a family of ﬁscal policies that includes a number of special cases frequently
considered in monetary economics. Perhaps the most commonly assumed ﬁscal regime is one in which public
debt equals zero at all times (B(t) = 0). It also includes policies that limit the growth rate of public debt
such as the Maastricht criterion, which sets an upper bound on debt of 60% of GDP ( ¯ B =0 .6y and g =0 ) .

















P(0)m(0) + B(0) = A(0). (31)
A perfect-foresight equilibrium is deﬁned as a function m and an initial price level P(0)
satisfying (29)-(31), given an exogenous function B satisfying (28) and A(0) > 0.
Figure 3 displays the phase diagram associated with equation (29), which, of course, is




 ⋅   
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qualitatively equivalent to that corresponding to equation (15) and shown in ﬁgure 1. In
particular, there exists a steady state m∗, associated with the target inﬂation rate π∗,a n da
steady state mL >m ∗, associated with the low inﬂation rate πL, that is, with the liquidity
20trap.
In addition, there exists an inﬁnite number of trajectories of real balances that originate
in the vicinity of mL and converge to mL as well as a continuum of trajectories starting in a
neighborhood to the right of m∗ that also converge to mL. These trajectories will represent
perfect-foresight equilibria if they satisfy the transversality condition (30). To the extent
that g<R (π(mL)) or ¯ B = 0, equation (30) will hold for any trajectory m converging to mL.
Therefore, if g<R (π(mL)) or ¯ B = 0, there is a continuum of perfect-foresight equilibria
starting arbitrarily close to the intended steady state m∗ that lead to the liquidity trap mL.
In this case, when the central bank follows an interest-rate feedback rule, switching from a
Ricardian ﬁscal policy to the non-Ricardian one under consideration does not protect the
economy from unintended deﬂationary dynamics.8
On the other hand, when monetary policy takes the form of a money-growth rate rule like
the one given by equation (25) with µ ≥ 0, the large number of perfect-foresight equilibria
that arises under the interest-rate feedback rule (7) is reduced to a unique one. To see this,














uc(y,m) dsB(t)=0 , (32)
given an exogenous function B satisfying (28) and the initial condition M(0) > 0.
We have already characterized the solutions to the diﬀerential equation (27), which are
summarized in ﬁgure 2. Recall that there exists a unique steady-state   m and a continuum
of trajectories starting to the right of   m and converging to inﬁnity. However, under the
ﬁscal policy considered here, none of the solutions in which real balances grow without
bound can be supported as a competitive equilibrium. This is because as m converges to
inﬁnity, the nominal interest rate, um(y,m)/uc(y,m), converges to zero, implying, given the
8To complete the characterization of equilibrium, we note that, unlike under a Ricardian ﬁscal policy,
the equilibrium displays nominal determinacy in the sense that given functions B and m, P(0) is uniquely
determined by (31).
21maintained assumption of a non-negative rate of money growth, that the ﬁrst term of the
transversality condition (32) fails to approach zero as t gets large. As a result, under the ﬁscal
policy restriction (28), a money growth rate peg is a successful tool to fend oﬀ self-fulﬁlling
liquidity traps.
AMonetary Policy Regime Switch
An interesting question that emerges from the above results is whether the central bank could
design a monetary policy that takes the form of a Taylor rule near the inﬂation target π∗ and
switches to a money growth rate rule when the economy appears to be sliding into a liquidity
trap. One obstacle that the construction of such a policy switch must tackle is to prevent an
anticipated discrete jump in the price level at the time of the regime change. Besides price
level smoothing, central bank behavior in developed countries has been described as pursuing
a smooth rate of inﬂation. This characterization is reﬂective of the observed remarkable
inﬂation inertia. In the context of our model, the equilibrium price level and inﬂation rate
are continuous if real balances and their time derivative are continuous.9 Accordingly, we
show how to design a monetary policy switch from a Taylor rule to a money growth rate
rule that eliminates the liquidity trap while guaranteeing continuity of m and ˙ m.
Let ˜ m be the threshold value of real balances below which the central bank follows the
interest-rate feedback rule given by (7) and above which it pegs the growth rate of the money
supply as described by equation (25). The dynamics of real balances are therefore given by
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One can choose the money growth rate µ and the threshold ˜ m in such a way that the dif-
9This follows from the fact that, regardless of the monetary regime, (4)-(6) imply that in equilibrium
π = ˙ λ/λ − r + um(y,m)/uc(y,m)a n d˙ λ/λ = ucm(y,m)/uc(y,m)˙ m.F r o mt h ef a c tt h a tπ exists everywhere
we have that P exists and is continuous.
22ferential equation (33) has a unique steady state at m∗, so that at the steady state monetary
policy takes the form of a Taylor rule and inﬂation coincides with the target π∗.F i g u r e 4
overimposes the phase diagrams corresponding to the interest rate feedback rule (ﬁgure 3)
Figure 4: The phase diagram of m under a monetary policy regime switch, Eqn. (33)
m
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and the money growth rate rule (ﬁgure 2). It is evident from ﬁgure 4 that in order for m∗
to be the unique steady state of (33), µ and ˜ m must be such that m∗ <   m<˜ m<m L.I n




To see why, note that m∗,   m,a n dmL are implicitly given by, respectively, um(y,m∗)/uc(y,m∗)=
r + π∗, um(y,   m)/uc(y,   m)=r + µ,a n dum(y,mL)/uc(y,mL)=r + πL.
However, not any value of ˜ m in the interval (  m,mL) guarantees the continuity of ˙ m.T h i s
further requirement will be met only if at ˜ m the right-hand sides of (27) and (29) are equal
to each other. It is apparent from ﬁgure 4 and from our characterization of equations (27)
and (29) that there exists at least one such value of real balances in the interval (  m,mL).
(Figure 4 is drawn under the assumption that there exists a unique such m). We pick any
one of these values for real balances as the threshold for the monetary policy switch. The
23solid line in ﬁgure 4 depicts the phase diagram of equation (33) when µ and ˜ m are chosen
so that m∗ is the only constant solution to that diﬀerential equation and ˙ m is continuous.
The target level of real balances m∗ is not just a steady-state solution to (33) but indeed
represents a perfect-foresight equilibrium. For, as we showed earlier, it satisﬁes the transver-
sality condition (30). In addition to m∗, equation (33) admits a continuum of solutions that
begin to the right of m∗ and converge to inﬁnity. However, none of these solutions can be
supported as perfect-foresight equilibria because, as real balances cross the threshold ˜ m,
monetary policy switches from an interest-rate feedback rule to a money growth rate rule
and real balances embark on an explosive path that, provided µ is nonnegative,10 violates
the transversality condition (32).
We conclude that the proposed monetary regime switch is successful at ruling out the liq-
uidity trap, preserving a Taylor rule around the target rate of inﬂation π∗, and guaranteeing
the continuity of the price level and inﬂation.
6 Discussion and conclusion
The zero bound on nominal interest rates makes economies in which monetary policy takes
the form of an interest-rate feedback rule prone to unintended equilibrium outcomes in which
business cycles are driven by non-fundamental shocks. When these undesirable circumstances
occur, the monetary authority ﬁnds itself powerless to bring about the policy objectives of
the government. It is precisely this inability of monetary policy to aﬀect key macroeconomic
variables, such as the level of inﬂation and the volatility of output and prices that is at the
heart of the concept of a liquidity trap.
Besides the explicit consideration of the zero bound on nominal interest rates, perhaps
the most notable diﬀerence between our model and those that stress the desirability of Taylor
rules is the absence of nominal rigidities. However, the possibility of falling into a liquidity
10The requirement µ ≥ 0 calls, given (34), for π∗ > 0. It follows that the monetary policy switch is
ineﬀective in eliminating the liquidity trap if the central bank targets a negative rate of inﬂation.
24trap as a consequence of Taylor-type rules is not limited to the simple ﬂexible-price environ-
ment presented in this paper. In Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh´ e, and Uribe (2000), we show that
Taylor rules also engender liquidity traps in environments with sluggish price adjustment.
In this type of model, the liquidity trap involves indeterminacy not only of inﬂation and
real balances, as in the model considered in this paper, but also of the level of aggregate
demand. The policy recommendations aimed to eradicate liquidity traps proposed in sec-
tions 4 and 5 are also eﬀective in economies with sticky prices. For those recommendations
involve the violation of a transversality condition in the event that the economy falls into a
liquidity trap. The violation of this long-run restriction depends on the asymptotic behavior
of the endogenous variables of the model, which is independent of short-run nominal price
rigidities.
A further diﬀerence between the theoretical environment considered in this paper and
that studied in part of the related literature is our treatment of time as a continuous variable.
Again, neither the existence of a liquidity trap emerging as a consequence of the adoption of
a Taylor rule nor the eﬀectiveness of the proposed remedies is aﬀected by this assumption in
any important way. Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2000) analyze a discrete-time cash-in-advance
model with cash and credit goods (which, as is well known, is equivalent to a money-in-the-
utility-function model with money and consumption being Edgeworth complements), and
show that a Taylor rule in combination with a lower bound on nominal rates gives rise to
an unintended liquidity trap. Because the nature of this undesirable equilibrium is identical
to that identiﬁed in this paper, the long-run restrictions that are capable of eliminating
liquidity traps in the continuous-time model will also be applicable under discrete time.
Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (1999) have proposed the use of Gesell taxes on monetary
balances as a way to avoid liquidity traps. A Gesell tax can be interpreted as a negative
interest rate on money. Because the opportunity cost of holding money is given by the
diﬀerence between the nominal rates of return on bonds and money, a Gesell tax allows the
opportunity cost of holding money to be positive when nominal interest rates on government
25bonds are negative. Thus, if a liquidity trap is understood as a situation in which the
opportunity cost of holding money becomes zero, then a Gesell tax clearly does not eliminate
it but simply pushes the nominal interest rate on bonds at which it occurs below zero.
Buiter and Panigirtzoglou argue, on empirical grounds, that the government’s ability to
set negative interest rates on bonds reduces the likelihood that a liquidity trap will ever occur.
They illustrate their idea by observing that if countries have a near-zero inﬂation target and
if the long-run real interest rate settles at a level of around 2%, then a contractionary
shock that calls for a reduction of the real interest rate of more than 2% would require the
government to set the nominal interest rate below zero, which (in the absence of Gesell taxes)
would be impossible.
The validity of this argument, however, hinges crucially on the assumption that the
inﬂation target is not aﬀected by the imposition of the Gesell tax. Such an assumption
would be realistic if deviations of inﬂation from zero have large negative welfare eﬀects, as
is the case, for example, in some models of nominal price stickiness like the one presented
in Calvo (1983), where both inﬂation and deﬂation exacerbate nominal price dispersion.
However, another determinant of the inﬂation target maybe the government’s desire to set
the inﬂation rate close to the one called for by the Friedman rule. This inﬂation rate falls
one-for-one with the Gesell tax rate. Therefore, the extend to which a Gesell tax will reduce
the likelihood of liquidity traps will be less the more weight the government assigns to the
objective of implementing the Friedman rule.
More importantly, Gesell taxes fail to rule out the liquidity traps that arise as a conse-
quence of Taylor-type monetary policy rules. What is important for the possibility of falling
into a liquidity trap in this case is the combination of a Taylor-type interest-rate rule with
the existence of some lower bound on nominal interest rates. Whether this bound is positive,
zero, or negative is immaterial.
26Appendix
Liquidity traps when the zero bound is binding
Consider a Taylor rule that stipulates a zero nominal interest rate for inﬂation rates below a
certain threshold. Speciﬁcally, following Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2000), we will focus on
a piecewise linear speciﬁcation:
R(π)=m a x [ 0,r+ π
∗ + γ(π − π
∗)]; γ>1; π
∗ > −r. (35)
This interest-rate feedback rule speciﬁes an active monetary policy for π>π≡ π∗−(r+π∗)/γ
and a passive one featuring a zero nominal interest rate for π<π . We wish to show that
under this monetary policy rule in combination with the ﬁscal regime given by (12), liquidity
traps continue to be a possible equilibrium outcome. For analytical convenience, we establish
the existence of liquidity traps under two speciﬁc parameterizations of the instant utility
function. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is
u(c,m)=c
am
b; a,b > 0,a+ b ≤ 1, (36)
which satisﬁes all the restrictions imposed on u in section 2.1. The second functional form
is
u(c,m)=l n ( m)+l n ( c − m). (37)
This utility function displays a satiation point for real balances at m = c/2a n dm ≡
min(m,c/2).
Assume ﬁrst that preferences are given by (36). Combining (4) and (5) yields a liquidity
preference function of the form R =( b/a)(c/m). It is clear that there exists no steady state
with ﬁnite m and R = 0. However, we will show that there exists a steady-state equilibrium
27with π = π∗ and a continuum of non-steady-state equilibria in each of which the inﬂation
rate starts in the interval (π,π∗) and converges to π. In the non-steady-state equilibria,
the nominal interest rate converges to 0 without ever reaching that ﬂoor, and real balances
converge to inﬁnity at the rate r + π.A s l o n g a s π>π , we have, time-diﬀerentiating
equation (4) and the liquidity preference function, that ˙ λ/λ = b ˙ m/m and ˙ R/R = − ˙ m/m,
respectively. Then equation (15) takes the form
˙ π = −
R(π)
bR (π)
[r + π − R(π)].
Using the Taylor rule given in (35), this expression becomes
˙ π =
r + π∗ + γ(π − π∗)
bγ
(γ − 1)(π − π
∗). (38)
The fact that the right-hand side of this expression is continuous and negative in the interval
(π,π∗) and vanishes at π∗ and π implies that π∗ is a steady-state solution and that there
exists a continuum of solutions starting in the interval (π,π∗) and converging to π. Because,
given the ﬁscal policy (12), the transversality condition (11) is always satisﬁed, all of these
solutions represent perfect-foresight equilibria. Thus, liquidity traps cannot be ruled out.
One can show that the policies designed in sections 4 and 5 are also capable of eliminating
liquidity traps under the interest-rate feedback rule (35) and the preference speciﬁcation
given in (36).11 Of particular interest is the case of a balanced-budget rule studied in
section 4.1. Recall that in order for this ﬁscal regime to be capable of eliminating the liquidity
trap, it is necessary that limt→∞
  t
0 R(s)ds < ∞. Solving the diﬀerential equation (38) and
using the interest-rate feedback rule (35), the equilibrium path of the nominal interest rate
associated with some π(0) ∈ (π,π∗) can be expressed as R(t)=( r + π∗)
δ1e−δ2t
δ1e−δ2t−1,w h e r e
δ1 =1+ r+π∗
γ(π(0)−π∗) < 0a n dδ2 =( r + π∗)(γ − 1)/(γb) > 0. Thus, limt→∞
  t
0 R(s)ds =
11A switch to a money growth rate peg that eliminates the liquidity trap ensuring the continuity of P and









28(r + π∗)ln(1− δ1)/δ2 < ∞.12
Consider now the utility function given in equation (37). In this case, there exist two
steady-state equilibria, π = −r and π = π∗, and a continuum of non-steady-state equilibria
in which the inﬂation rate originates in the interval (π,π∗) and converges to −r.T o s e e
that π = −r represents a perfect-foresight equilibrium, note that R(−r) = 0, so that in
equilibrium m must be greater or equal to the satiation point y/2a n dλ is constant and
equal to 2/y. Since the transversality condition is always satisﬁed under the ﬁscal policy (12),
all equilibrium conditions are satisﬁed.
If π>π , then equation (15) takes the form
˙ π = −
2+R(π)
γ
[1 + R(π)][r + π − R(π)].
Clearly, π = π∗ represents a solution to this diﬀerential equation. In addition there exists
an inﬁnite number of solutions starting in the interval (π,π∗) that decline monotonically
reaching π in ﬁnite time. At that point the above diﬀerential equation ceases to hold, m
reaches the satiation point y/2, R vanishes, and π jumps down to −r. Because under the
ﬁscal regime (12), the transversality condition is always satisﬁed, all these trajectories as
well as the steady state π = π∗ represent perfect-foresight equilibrium outcomes.
Again, one can show that the policies presented in sections 4 and 5 will rule out liquidity
traps.13 In particular, under a balanced-budget requirement the liquidity trap can be ruled
out because R(t) vanishes in ﬁnite time, so that limt→∞
  t
0 R(s)ds < ∞.
12Under diﬀerent preference speciﬁcations whether this limit is ﬁnite or not will depend on the values
taken by the parameters describing preferences and the interest rate feedback rule.
13The existence of a smooth switch to a money growth rate rule that eliminates the liquidity trap requires
that γ<2.
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